Labor Relations - A Place at the Table?
- Pursuant to this arrangement, in Germany, a portion of the Corporate Board is allocated to employee representatives.
- Labor relations on the spot. See many earlier articles, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=169870/ need to vet); see also the letter of one MC of Forest Hills, Queens 11/16/2010 in NYT 11/19/2010 at A24, attributing Germany's comparative economic success with its system of corporate board co-determination, roughly. FN 1. Current assessments, roughly: European Trade Union Confederation at http://www.etuc.org/a/382
ND............Needs depth; then provide a targeted response place for followup, either on its website or for a later update in the paper. FN 3PP.............
Pip pip! Excellence in the field!;
WWI.........Worthwhile Inquiry. ETC
1. It is hereby enacted that a Commission to Review Corporate Law in the several states; and, as may be applicable, feds; shall be established to determine
a. whether co-determination is beneficial to economic sustainability, to the nation as a whole, and
b. what bars inclusion of co-determination here, except for the power of corporate goals and beneficence to benefit themselves; and not the corporation itself and its shareholders.
FN 1 The letter: Re- Corporate board includes employees, benefits
MC proposes that Germany weathered the recession best because of this major factor: that
1) German law requires that half the board seats of the bigger corporations go to employee representatives, and so
2) all employees' hours could and were cut back, rather than some workers fired.
FN 2. The vetting:
On the topic of codetermination, see Columbia Law School at its Working Papers site, ://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/law_economics/wp_listing_1/wp_listing/121_130#6920/ This is Working Paper from 1988 (old! old!) at 128 German Codetermination and German Securities Markets (Roe, Mark J), Columbia Law Review, Vol.98, No. 1, pp. 167-183, 1998.
Nonetheless, the German Codetermination idea produced back in 1998 already had its own problems -- the site points out that it produces a broadly based ownership that weakens an otherwise strong board and hinders its acting decisievly when that is needed. Lots of backfence jockeying goes on, but the board remains a waffley entity. Some kinds of markets just do not develop.
So: if the NYT had invited responses, this might be a good one.
FN 3 The Updating.
Now what: Given a global recession, how has the Codetermination worked since 1988. This takes more time and expertise. The corporate board makeup type. Representatives of employees on boards. And how have German laws changed about it since 1998, if at all. Perhaps really well, perhaps it was other factors. LF&GB. Oh, Angela! Is that you? Yes, fine. Fine. Now, about .......
How would codetermination on boards in America affect collection and dissemination of corporate assets-cash for political purposes, and related secrecy issues.
Is that a way to ensure that any use of corporate funds for political candidates is approved by employees also? This still leaves disgruntled shareholders in the lurch, who have to either vote out the board or sell their shares if they do not want their corporate assets going to Dark Age Evangelism Central, for example. Not all is solved by one approach, is that so.